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HISTORIANOF EcoNOMIc THOUGHT*
By T. W. Hutchison
Over a number of years Professor Wesley Mitchell delivered a
course of lectures at Columbia University which surveyed the his-
tory of economic thought a.nd was entitled "Types of Economic
Theory." In 1934-35 these lectures were stenographically tran-
scribed, and have now been edited by Messrs. J. M. Gould and
• A. M. Kelley. Professor Mitchell never saw these notes, and dis-
claimed all responsibility for their accuracy. The reader may there-
fore feel that he is meeting Professor Mitchell's min'd at one, or
even two, removes; first, in that he is reading what was designed
to be listened to, and secondly, in that what he is reading was not
seen or revised by Mitchell. Criticism in detail may therefore seem
to have a somewhat doubtful significance.
This is not to imply that there are any grounds for doubting the
excellence of the transcription and editing, for which, rather, there
is every reason to be profoundly grateful. Here and there passages
occur of doubtful clarity and continuity, more especially in Vol-
ume II, where, as the course goes on, increasing space is devofed
to the questions and discussions from student listeners, which
Mitchell directly called for. The audience at Columbia must have'
been a very large one, but the tenor of the exchanges between
professor and students seems to have been beautifully direct and
informal.. Years later, even if one never saw or heard Professor
Mitchell, one can feel the weight of the impression made on his
audience by his breadth of view and of learning, ,his and
good humor, and his profound tolerance, patience and honesty,
all monumentally clear in the pages of these notes.
*Originallyappeared as a review of Lecture Notes on Types of Economic
Theory (a stenographic transcript ofclass lectures givenby Wesley C. Mitchell
in 1934-35; published by Augustus M. Kelley, 1949) in the Economic Journal,
• March 1951. Here reprinted, with only minor changes, by permission of the
author and publisher.
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Inan obituary article1 (Economic Journal, 1949, p. 455) Pro-
fessor Dorfman tells us that Mitchell had given this course on
"Types of Economic' Theory" since he succeeded J. B. Clark at
Columbia in 1913, and
had long planned that a book on that subject should follow Business
Cycles.... Thebook would attempt to characterize and criticize
current theories;... but.as he progressed with his work he became
increasingly impressed with the need• for an exhaustive study of the
school from which the dominant stream of economic thought traced its
origin.
• By 1934 "Types of Economic Theory" had come to be describ-
able as a historical survey of economic thought from Adam Smith
to the present day. As any readable or listenable history of eco
nomic thought must be, the survey is severely selective, grouped
around the main great figures (especially in Volume I), and based
on a firm methodological point of view, which is apparent, but not
obtrusive or obstructive, on many pages. Mitchell's institutionalist
point of view at one time caused considerable vexation in some
quarters. But these lectures give no grounds for. the revival of "old
unhappy far-off things and battles long ago." Mitchell's institu-
tionalist principles provide a firm perspective for his lecture course,
but even for those who disagree with them, they do not, or at any
rate ought and need not, get. in the way of. his historical survey.
Mitchell's starting point for his is summarized in the
following passages from his first lecture in 1934:
The economic theorists who have counted most in the development of
thought have been men who have been very deeply concerned with
problems that troubled their generations. Their theories have been
attempts to deal scientifically with these problems, to point out prom-
ising means of practical action (p. 1). ...Whathas been true of the
development of economics in the past is. likely I think (and here of
course I have to. speak with far less assurance) to prove true of the
development of econOmics in the future (p. 5).... Thechief task
of this course is not to acquaint you with the history of economic
theory in the last one hundred and fifty years. It is primarily to
acquaint you with the way in which economics has developed as part
of humanity's struggle to deal with the problems that evolving social
life has brought upon us (p. 7)..
1Reprintedin this volume, pp. 12 5-38.294 T. W. HUTCHISON
As contrasted with his own approach Mitchell later discusses
the alternative approach which he ascribed to most histories of eco-
nomic thought. It is a measure of Professor Mitchell's tolerance
and breadth of view that this is perhaps the most, or even the only,
faintly "exciusivist" or intolerant passage in these where
what is most valuable and entirely justifiable as an organizing prin-
ciple for the purposes of this course, shows some slight sign of
deteriorating into one of those dogmatic oversimplifications which
Mitchell, as much as anyone, was able to keep himself above:
English political economy from the time of Adam Smith up to the
present has had its course of development shaped in very large measure
by the current issues of the day. We are likely to think of a science as
coming down as a birthright and growing by logical development. We
might very well have our minds fixed on a subject like mathematics.
If some discoverer starts a new idea, that certain idea has certain
implications which might be accepted writers, and each
will get his chief inspiration from the account of the writer before
him. It is a process of intellectual development.
Now that is not a really true picture of mathematics, and it is prob-
ably even less true of a science ]ike physics or chemistry. In economics
I think it is aulte a mistake to believe that this birthright intellectual
development has occurred. The passing on of ideas from one to another
and the development of these ideas by successive generations as an
intellectual stunt has been in economics a secondary rather than a
primary factor. The thing which has most of all stimulated the minds
of successive generations of economists has been to endeavor tO con-
tribute to the understanding of the problems with which their genera-
tion as a whole was concerned. It isquite probable, especially since
economics had become an academic sub lect, that we have had our
academic writers whose attitude seems to be primarily that of improv-
ing the theories which their predecessors have put forward, endeavor-
ing to free those theories from incOnsistendes and carry them to a
somewhat higher stage of development. This viewpoint you find given
most emnhasis in the histories of economic doctrines.
That I think is a rather false picture. The most important factor
has been that the generation of Ricardo faced problems of a different
sort from that of Adam Smith;• and it was because he reflected on a
different set of circumstances that Ricarclo changed the perspective
of economic theory. Thus, it is -because successive generations have
faced different problems than Ricardo did that they have worked out
new ideas, new sides of the subject and given opinions which differ
from those of the classical group (p. 45).HISTORIAN OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 295
This seems today at least one degree truer than it was in
1934. Nevertheless, it is permissible to insist against it that there
are considerable passages in the history of economic thought where
"logical development," and "the passing on of ideas from one to
another," is an important and even the main part of the "story,
though never, of course, the whole stOry. This particularly seems
to be the case after 1870 with the rise of economics as an academic
specialism, and Professor Mitchell noticeably does not succeed in
carrying out his institutionalist program in Volume II, which deals
with this period, to anything like the extent he does, in Volume I
covering Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill.
But while it may be insisted that the "internal" logical develop-
ments of the subject must not be neglected in a full and balanced
history, the supreme value and interest of Professor Mitchell's ap-
proach must be recognized, particularly when carried through
with Mitchell's tolerance and breadth of learning. One variety of
the "external" approach to the history of the subject, purporting
to explain economic thought as the product Of the problems of its
times (from "outside" the subject itself) is all too familiar in the
more dogmatic forms of infantile Marxism and historical relativ-
ism, emphasizing well beyond the point of distortion a single one
of many "external" influences. An "external" approach must in-
clude as an important part of it the Marxist approach. But it must
take account of both sides of the ancestry of political economy and
its offspring academic economics: that is, both the
from the topical, often pamphieteering, engage literature on cur-
rent economic problems, and the influence of the ideas of the great
English philosophers (who were also among the main architects
of political economy) about the nature of human activities and of
our knowledge of them, of which economic activities and eco-
nomic are, respectively,' inseparable parts. This is what
Mitchell does in his Volume I, providing a wonderful fusion of
the history of economic thought with economic and political his-
tory, and with the history of political and moral philosophy, the
story and development of each successfully illuminating the story
and development of all the others.
It has sometimes been. complained of degree courses in the social
sciences (or in branches of them), that the separate departmental296 T. W.HUTCHISON
sections do not adequately fuse into a whole in which the parts
mutually mean much for one another, 'and it is rightly held that
without this synthesis and mutual illumination the separate parts
may lose very seriously in value and significance. It is obviously
very difficult, or impossible, in textbooks of economic analysis (and
possibly in those on political thought), to do anything to help
towards this generally recognized need. But in the history of eco-
nomic thought, particularly before it became an academic spe-
cialism, there ought perhaps to be a considerable educational
opportunity. In fact, Volume I of Professor Mitchell's Lectures
shows that in the hands of one with Mitchell's intellectual range
and equipment there is such an opportunity.
Volume I deals with five central figures—Smith, Bentham,
Ricardo, Maithus and J. S. Mill. But the titles of some of the lec-
tures show how widely the course ranges: "English Developments.
in the Eighteenth Century .and the Phenomenon of Individual
Initiative"; "The Development of Government'by Public Discus-
sion"; "Individual Initiative in Local Government. and Changes
in Economic Conditions"; "Mercantilism versus Individual Initia-
tive in the Eighteenth Century"; "Adam Smith's Influence upon
British Politics"; "The Effect of the upon
British Politics and Economic Conditions"; "Bentham's Felicific
Calculus and Conception of Human Nature"; "His Influence
Upon the Development of Economic Theory"; "The Bullion Con-
troversy"; "Reasons for the Popularity of Ricardo's Analysis";
"The Philosophical Radicals"; "Their Activities and Political Posi-
tion"; "Political Events and How They Aided in Bringing About
the Reforms Which the Philosophical Radicals Advocated"; "The
Passage of the Great Reform Bill of 1832"; "Similarities and
trasts between the Processes of Social Reform and Reform in
Methods of Production in England"; "Politics, Social Reform,
and Political Economy in the Period from 1832 to 1848."
Of course, the specialist in any one of these complex subjects will
feel that to avoid oversimplification and distortion they require at
least a volume, or a course of lectures, per piece, rather than a
single lecture. But there are also serious, and even very dangerous,
diseconomies in such specialism as this implies, when pursued in
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degree of oversimplification is as considerable or dangerous as that,
in its different way, inevitable in any textbook of economic analysis.
The choice of Bentham for detailed attention, usually given
little or no space in histories of economic thought, fOllows obvi-
ously from Professor Mitchell's approach. From his suspicious
scrutiny of the postulates of classical economic theory, Mitchell
had come to the conclusion that Bentham was the great source of
the deficiency be believed them to contain. Lord Keynes (of course
quite independently), in his most fundamental onslaughts on
"classical" thought in 1937-38, came also to see Bentham as the
great source of the "classical" taint. (See his article in the Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, February 1937, the opening paragraph
of his article in the Eugenics Review, April 1937, and, a decade
previously, some significant passages in his obituary of Edgeworth,
Essays in Biography, pp. 281-2.)
Mitchell saw that the limitations he suspected were not remov-
àble, as was often held by neoclassical "spokesmen," by simply
excluding Benthamite hedonism from the postulates of economic
theory or by emasculating or even dropping entirely such concepts
as "social utility" or "utility" itself. This removal was quite easily
achieved without damage to the impressiveness of what Keynes
called the superstructure of "classical" theory. Mitchell and Keynes
saw that the deficiency went deeper.
Bentham was the main founder and propagator of the notion
that something of profound and far-reaching explanatory signifi-
cance, normative or positive, is being said about human activities,
or some section or aspect of them, when they are dçscribed as
"maximizing" activities. He. is the great originator of individual-
ist, "micro-economic," or "micro-political," "maximizing" analy-
sis. Obviously, however elaborate, impressive or refined they may
be, maximizing formulas must depend for their significance, except
as analytical tours de force, on the significance and content of the
"rnaximand." As Mitchell and Keynes saw, the problem of the
content of the maximand has never been very satisfactorily solved,
and social science would be ominously simple if it could be. "Pleas-
ure," "happiness," "satisfaction,""utility," "Nutzen," "ophe-
limity," "significance," "social utility," "welfare," "real income,"
"national income" and "profits" have at various stages filled the.298 T. W. HUTCHISON
essential role of the maximand in one or other branch of maxi-
mizing analysis. Some are palpably misleading and false, others
palpably empty or insignificant. All are almost inevitably unsatis-
factorily defined. Even "profits" as the maximand for the entre-
preneur, which seems to provide something more solid and objec-
tive on which .to build, is now under heavy fire as a point
for the theory of the firm. Anyhow, in an uncertain world, even if
there was something reasonably clearly definable which most peo-
ple's activity was aimed at maximizing, they simply do not know,
in most of the situations in which we are interested, how to maxi-
mize. Therefore what has to be studied are what are. described as
their expectations, or the multiform ways in which they happen to.
come to think, hope, guess or have a hunch as to how they can
maximize. As Keynes put it:
I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of these pretty,
polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting
from the fact that we know very little about the future. ... Theortho-
dox theory assumes that we have a knowledge of the future of a kind
quite different from that which we actually possess. This false rational-
ization follows the lines of the Benthamite calculus.
Mitchell in 1934 concentrated his attack rather too much on
the pleasure and pain units of the Benthamite calculus, and not so
much as Keynes did later on the limitations and liability to empti-
ness of any such calculus, in whatever units it is formulated, as an
explanation of human activities in a world of which the essential
problematic feature is incalculable uncertainty. But his criticism
amOunts tO very much the same as Keynes':
From Bentham's own point of view there are only two ways in which
to give a really scientific account of human behavior. Of course, you
have to deal with the forces of pleasure and pain that are going, to
rule conduct,' but if you are any observer you will note that since men
are not good calculating machines you cannot expect that what you.
as an enlightened theorist presumably calculate conäerning the prom-
ise of pleasure or pain to be held up by a certain act will be seen by all
the other people. ... Soyou are forced to study the defects of the
understanding of classes of men and allow for them in your theory.
That is something that you will find the classical economists doing;
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working classes, owing to their defective foresight, brought the most
grievous of pains upon themselves by marrying too early and having
too large families. ... Andthen men think they understand business
cycles by saying that in periods of prosperity people get too excited;
they allow their feelings to bias their business calculations. ... Soat
large, you can explain how people are going to act by making allow-
ances for widely prevalent failures of the' understanding. But of course
that sort of operation is not any too certain; and there is only one other
way you can do the thing, that is, actually observe what people do...
(p.104).
Professor 'Mitchell's tolerance and, understanding are shown at
their greatest in his lectures on Ricardo, of whom he gives a more
deeply sympathetic and detailed interpretation, and defense than
have several of Ricardo's more orthodox descendants. Mitchell's
lectures also inculcate a much more appreciative approach to J. S.
Mill's Principles than that work has often received from, later
economists. The rapidity with which it was written, some notori-
ously unfortunate claims to finality (for example, on value), and
•its long use, and possibly dogmatic misuse, as a standard textbook,
seem often to have provoked a distrust that has deprived it of the
fresh sympathetic reading it deserves ,as the last (except for Sidg-
wick's) of the great Principles by a philosopher and political
thinker.
Professor Mitchell's second volume opens with long sections on
Jevons and Marshall, but Mitchell does not deploy, and in a sense
could not have, deployed, the same methods of interpretation as he
does for the subjects of his first volume. The reason surely is, in the
main, that the logical development of ideas becomes of much
greater significance relatively to the historical and institutional
background. One has only to look at the titles of Mitchell's lectures
in Volume II to see the inevitable narrowing of the range. They
are far more often simply the names of the economists or the titles
of the works which Mitchell has selected for discussion. Of the
two figures in this period who did range more widely than their
colleagues, Pareto and Wieser, Pareto is hardly mentioned, *hile
Mitchell confines himself to dissecting, at perhaps rather undue
length, Wieser's problematic conception of a "psychological" eco-.
nomic theory that has no reference to psychology, and does not300 T. W. HUTCH1SO.N
discuss his Gesetz der Machi, or the sociological framework of his
Social Economics.
There is in Volume II a great deal that is' instructive about
American economics of the period not very well known in Britain,
and, of course, authoritative and most interesting accounts of
Veblen and Commons. Volume II is an indispensable (and pos-
sibly the best) work on its period, but hardly comparable with, and
hardly as challenging in its approach as Volume I.
In the days of Cannan, Bonar, Foxwell and Higgs, the history
of economic thought seems to have absorbed, in Britain, a
much larger percentage of a much smaller total supply of eco-
nomic lecturing and literary effort. Nous avonschangé tout cela.
•Not, of course, that it is possible, especially in the stress of funda-
mental controversies, to cut oneself off cleanly from the past his-
tory of the subject. If the history is not there (or being systemati-
cally cultivated) it is apt to be invented ad hoc, and the concep-
tion of conflicting "all-in" revelations, ancient or modern, tends to
replace the conception of complex historical development.
No two Anglo-Saxon economists might seem farther apart in
interest, methods and background than Edgeworth and Mitchell,
but to catch what seems to be Mitchell's ultimate intent and ideal
in these lectures it seems that one would do best to go back to a
passage from Edgeworth's inaugural lecture in 1891:
The history of theory is particularly instructive in political economy
as in philosophy. History and literature, dialectics, and all that the
Greeks comprehensively called words, seem the best corrective of the
narrow prejudices and deceptive associations which are s.ure to be con-
tracted by those who have been confined to a single school or system.